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The Nonprofit Sector’s Uncertain Future 
in a Post-TCJA America 
The tax deduction for charitable contributions has existed in the 
Internal Revenue Code in some form since the early 1900s. While the 
charitable deduction has been preserved in the U.S. tax code for more than 
100 years, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of December 2017 threatens 
charities by removing the tax incentive to donate to charity from all but 
the wealthiest taxpayers. 
Both charities and nonprofits play a vital role in the U.S. economy by 
providing some goods and services more efficiently than the public or 
private sectors. In this Note I explore the role of nonprofits in the U.S. 
economy and how the federal government has used tax incentives to 
encourage taxpayers to donate to charities. I describe how new changes in 
TCJA, including doubling the standard deduction, increasing the estate 
tax exemption, capping the state and local tax deduction, and lowering the 
income tax rates, remove the tax incentives for most individual taxpayers 
to donate to charity. I then propose solutions to the problems that TCJA 
created for charities. I submit that a carefully constructed universal 
charitable deduction could be a fiscally efficient subsidy. TCJA created an 
uncertain future for the nonprofit sector. Implementing the proposals in 
this Note could help preserve the future of the nonprofit sector in the 
United States by making the tax incentive to give to charity available to 
all taxpayers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 I’m a believer that philanthropy is not a financial decision; you’ve got 
the gene to give—it feels good, literally it’s the love of humans. I get that. 
But if it wasn’t at least a little tied to a financial decision, then why are 
all of our charitable funds established at the end of the year?1 
The preceding quote introduces an interesting concept: is 
donating to charity motivated by a universal human desire to assist 
others, or is it a financial decision? It is most likely some mixture of 
the two, but this is only one of many issues that charities must 
grapple with as they try to predict the effects of 2017’s Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act (TCJA), a tax bill that may reduce donations to charities by 
up to $24 billion this year.2 As a result of TCJA, millions of tax-
payers will no longer have an incentive to use the charitable deduc-
tion, which reduces a taxpayer’s taxable income by the amount 
 
 1. Bernie Story, president of the Lehigh Valley Community Foundation, a group that 
provides charitable funds in Pennsylvania, quoted in Carolyn Y. Johnson, The GOP Plan to 
Simplify Taxes Could Put Charitable Giving at Risk, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/10/11/the-gop-plan-to-simpli 
fy-taxes-could-put-charitable-giving-at-risk/?utm_term=.7ea7f6218425. 
 2. Bryan McQueeney, Opinion, The GOP Tax Reform Will Devastate Charitable Giving, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mc 
queeney-charitable-giving-under-new-tax-law-20171227-story.html. 
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they donate to charity.3 This leaves U.S. charities in a vulnerable 
position, especially since many of them already operate on tight 
budgets. The number of taxpayers who can take advantage of this 
deduction is expected to drop from 37 million to around 16 million 
this year, as estimated in one study by the Urban-Brookings Tax 
Policy Center.4 If donating to charity is indeed (at least in part) a 
financial decision, as the introductory quote suggests, one can 
expect donations to charities to decrease for tax year 2018. 
This Note provides an overview of how TCJA may discourage 
taxpayers from donating to charities until TCJA sunsets in 2025. I 
will begin in Part II by investigating the important role that the 
nonprofit sector, which includes charities, plays in the U.S. 
economy. In Part III, I will explore how a past tax reform affected 
charitable giving in the United States. In Part IV, I will summarize 
key changes to the tax code, as a result of TCJA, that may decrease 
charitable donations, including the increase in the standard 
deduction, the increase in the estate tax exemption, and the $10,000 
state and local tax deduction cap. To finish, I will propose changes 
to the current tax law that could prevent the potential problems 
associated with TCJA. The first proposal is to extend a charitable 
deduction to nonitemizers. The second is to extend the ability to 
deduct charitable donations through April 15 to encourage donat-
ing closer to the end of the tax season. My third suggestion is to 
eliminate the phaseout for the charitable deduction. TCJA removes 
the incentive to donate to charity from the tax code for all but the 
wealthy who can continue to take the charitable deduction. Imple-
menting any of these proposals could help preserve the incentive 
in the tax code to donate to charity for everyone, instead of just the 
wealthy, as TCJA does now. 
 
 3. Under § 67(b)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer is authorized to take an 
itemized deduction, which reduces the taxpayer’s overall taxable income, for “deductions 
under section 170 (relating to charitable, etc., contributions and gifts).” 26 U.S.C § 67(b) 
(2018); see also 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2018). 
 4. Fred Stokeld, Fewer Taxpayers Expected to Claim Charitable Deduction, TAX NOTES 
(Jan. 29, 2018). 
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II. CHARITIES AND THEIR ROLE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 
While one of the purposes of TCJA was to simplify taxes by 
reducing the number of itemizers, it created complications and 
uncertainty for charities. TCJA will likely end itemization for most 
Americans, who will no longer have to worry about keeping track 
of charitable donations or home mortgage interest,5 two popular 
itemized deductions. While this may be convenient for taxpayers, 
charities that rely heavily on donations to perform their role may 
be in danger of losing funding if fewer people give to charity this 
year and coming years in response to TCJA. This Part explains the 
important role of the charitable or nonprofit sector in the U.S. 
economy, demonstrates that the U.S. government recognizes this 
role and supports the charitable sector through tax incentives, and 
shows that TCJA has charities worried about the implications of 
reducing the availability of the charitable deduction. For clarifi-
cation, the word charity in this Note does not refer simply to gener-
osity to the poor. For purposes of this Note, I will be using the terms 
charity and nonprofit interchangeably, both referring to any organi-
zation to which taxpayers can make deductible donations under 
§ 170 of the Internal Revenue Code.6 
A. Role of Charities in the U.S. Economy 
The charitable sector is a vital part of the U.S. economy and 
plays a role that supports the public sector in promoting the general 
good and solving social problems.7 The nonprofit sector is made 
up of hospitals, religious groups, associations, schools, research 
universities, nongovernmental organizations, and some inter-
national relief agencies.8 In the last year, members of the nonprofit 
sector have provided relief to U.S. citizens in the face of multiple 
disasters. They stepped up to help people who lost their homes in 
 
 5. Johnson, supra note 1. 
 6. 26 U.S.C. § 170. 
 7. C. Eugene Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving: 
Reforming the Tax Rules for Charitable Contributions and Charitable Organizations, 12 AM.  J.  TAX 
POL’Y 399, 401–02 (1995). 
 8. Charles T. Clotfelter & Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Impact of Fundamental Tax 
Reform on Nonprofit Organizations, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 211, 
211 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996). 
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California’s wildfires and in the hurricanes and floods that devas-
tated Puerto Rico and the Gulf Coast.9 They responded to mass 
shootings in Texas, Florida, and Las Vegas.10 They worked to meet 
the needs of hungry children, abused women, the disabled, and 
the homeless.11 
B. The Government’s Interest in Subsidizing the Charitable Sector 
The United States relies on nonprofits significantly more than 
other countries and provides nonprofits with favorable tax 
treatment for carrying out important social functions.12 Congress 
has passed laws to ensure that organizations are properly classified 
as tax exempt, but it provides incentives to nonprofits and their 
donors because they play an important role in the U.S. economy. 
The nonprofit sector, in turn, has molded itself to conform to the 
tax code in order to continue to enjoy these tax incentives.13 The 
government’s interest in subsidizing nonprofits stems from the fact 
that nonprofits often fill gaps the government cannot fill. For 
instance, many churches provide public goods that the government 
would otherwise have to pay for, including counseling, youth 
programs, and aid to the poor. At a time when discretionary gov-
ernment services are growing scarcer, and the federal government 
contemplates more budget cuts, the nonprofit sector’s role in filling 
holes in social safety nets has become even more important.14 
Nonprofits not only provide a safety net for the unfortunate, they 
provide many other public goods, thereby relieving government of 
the cost of doing so. 
The charitable deduction decreases the amount of revenue the 
government can raise because it reduces the amount of an indivi-
dual’s or household’s money the government can tax. Though the 
federal government loses money by preserving the charitable 
deduction, this loss is offset by a greater increase in charitable 
donations, arguably making the deduction a fiscally efficient 
 
 9. McQueeney, supra note 2. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, supra note 8. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, supra note 8, at 217. 
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subsidy.15 Congress clearly has a vested interest in preserving the 
charitable deduction. Some studies have found that eliminating the 
deduction altogether could reduce individual charitable donations 
by amounts as high as 35%, which would cripple charitable organi-
zations and, consequently, put more pressure on the public sector.16 
C. Leaders of Charitable Organizations Respond to TCJA 
Some charities rely more heavily on deductible donations than 
others, so it is difficult to make general statements about how 
changes to the tax code will affect charities.17 However, it is clear 
that TCJA will decrease the number of taxpayers who itemize. In 
2017, itemizers gave approximately $239 billion in charitable dona-
tions while nonitemizers contributed an estimated $53 billion.18 
According to a study at Indiana University, more than 80% of 
itemizers made charitable donations in 2017, compared to only 44% 
of nonitemizers.19 Last year 25 million homes itemized, and some 
studies estimate that number dropping to 7 million for the 2018 tax 
year.20 Charities now face an uncertain future because it is difficult 
to predict how many taxpayers will continue to itemize and how 
many new nonitemizers will continue to donate without the tax 
incentives to do so. Those who will itemize for the 2018 tax year 
will overwhelmingly be wealthier households.21 Many of the 
households that will no longer be able to take advantage of the 
charitable deduction are middle-class households, meaning chari-
ties that depend on donations from middle-class donors will likely 
be those most affected by TCJA.22 
The United Way is a charity that depends on smaller donations 
from middle-class families. It receives an average of 7.2 million 
donations every year, averaging around $154 per donation.23 
 
 15. Ernest M. Zampelli & Steven T. Yen, The Impact of Tax Price Changes on Charitable 
Contributions to the Needy, 35 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 113, 121 (2017). 
 16. Id. at 113. 
 17. Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, supra note 8, at 213. 
 18. JOSEPH ROSENBERG ET AL., URBAN INST., THE NEW DEBATE OVER A CHARITABLE DE-
DUCTION FOR NONITEMIZERS 1, 5 (Oct. 2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default 
/files/publication/135446/the-new-ebate-over-a-charitable-deduction-for-nonitemizers.pdf. 
 19. Johnson, supra note 1. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 23. Johnson, supra note 1. 
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Steven Taylor, senior vice president at United Way Worldwide, 
discussed the difficulties facing charities as a result of TCJA: 
 We have spent an enormous amount of time up on the Hill, 
and we get back the talking point, “Oh, don’t worry—we preserve 
the charitable deduction.” That makes it seems [sic] like many 
lawmakers don’t understand, themselves, what the ramifications 
of this legislation are . . . . A lot of charities are coming to grips 
with the fact that there may come a point where individual 
charities would have to start having to come out in actual 
opposition to the tax reform bill—and no charities want to be put 
in that position.24 
Some charities are legitimately concerned about the implica-
tions of TCJA. One may wonder if these concerns are warranted or 
if Americans are more altruistic when it comes to donating to 
charity. By looking at a previous tax reform that changed incentives 
for taxpayers to give to charity, one can see that tax incentives 
motivate charitable giving in the United States and that dimin-
ishing such incentives will likely decrease charitable giving. 
III. HOW THE 1981 TAX REFORM AFFECTED 
CHARITABLE DONATIONS 
Deciding to what extent tax incentives motivate charitable 
giving in the United States would be an extremely difficult task, but 
past tax reforms provide insight into the effect changes to the tax 
code have on taxpayer behavior with respect to charitable dona-
tions. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) has attracted 
a lot of attention from scholars because it slowly introduced a 
charitable deduction for nonitemizers between 1982 and 1986.25 The 
data about this nonitemizer deduction as it existed in the 1980s 
allows us to compare the responsiveness of nonitemizer giving to 
tax incentives and, therefore, determine whether charitable giving 
is significantly influenced by tax incentives. 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Christopher M. Duquette, Is Charitable Giving by Nonitemizers Responsive to Tax 
Incentives? New Evidence, 52 NAT’L TAX  J. 195, 195–96 (1999). 
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A. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
ERTA slowly phased in a charitable deduction for nonitemizers. 
During the first two years, nonitemizers could only deduct 25 cents 
per dollar given to charity for the first $100 of giving, with a max-
imum deduction of $25.26 In 1984, the ceiling on deductible giving 
increased to $300, so nonitemizers could receive a charitable deduc-
tion of up to $75.27 In 1985, the ceiling was removed, and nonitem-
izers were allowed to deduct half of the amount they gave to charity 
with no limitation on the total amount of giving.28 By 1986, non-
itemizer giving was completely deductible and identical to the 
charitable deduction for itemizers. The effect of the ERTA experi-
ment on nonitemizer giving is summarized in the following table.29 
Table 1 
 
From this data, it is clear that giving among nonitemizers 
increased when contribution limits were removed in 1985 and 
again in 1986. The average dollar amount claimed per nonitemizer 
increased from $51 to $186 between 1984 and 1985. This number 
increased again to $474 in 1986, the last year that the charitable 
deduction was available to nonitemizers.30 Between 1982 and 1986, 
taxpayers donated an estimated $31.16 billion to charities.31 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 196. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. Total of $31.16 billion found by multiplying the dollars claimed each year by 
the appropriate multiple. From 1982 through 1984, the dollars claimed in billions multiplied 
by four represents the total amount given to charity, as only 25 cents per dollar could be 
claimed by the taxpayer. In 1985, the dollars claimed must be multiplied by two to find the 
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B. ERTA Aftermath 
The preceding data on ERTA supports the claim that charitable 
giving by nonitemizers is responsive to tax incentives. With respect 
to charities, ERTA’s purpose was to introduce a tax deduction for 
charitable giving to nonitemizers who previously did not have that 
incentive. The nonitemizer deduction in the bill was enacted to 
“stimulate giving by all individual taxpayers, including those who 
do not benefit from itemizing.”32 In that respect, ERTA succeeded 
and was able to increase charitable giving in the United States 
during the short period that it was available. 
Another important takeaway from ERTA is that the degree of 
responsiveness to tax incentives with respect to donations for 
nonitemizers is smaller than it is for itemizers.33 Nonitemizers 
generally are less responsive to changes in the price of giving since 
they have less disposable income than itemizers. But ERTA 
reduced the after-tax price of charitable contributions for non-
itemizers and succeeded in stimulating charitable giving by this tax 
group.34 Understanding how nonitemizers respond to incentives in 
the tax code could assist policymakers in designing charitable 
contribution deductions that could apply to nonitemizers if the 
provision were to be revived.35 Nonitemizers are an important 
group to consider when studying whether a universal charitable 
deduction would be effective, since taxpayers who itemize have 
more of an incentive to give to charity and are more responsive to 
changes in the price of giving.36 
If ERTA was so valuable and it stimulated charitable giving, 
even among nonitemizers, why did Congress let it expire in 1986? 
It’s important to understand that Congress set a 1986 expiration 
date when ERTA was enacted in 1981 so it could assess ERTA’s 
effectiveness and determine whether the charitable deduction for 
 
total amount donated to charity. The amount claimed in 1986 represents the total amount 
given to charity, as charitable donations were fully deductible by that year. 
 32. Amy E. Dunbar & John Phillips, The Effect of Tax Policy on Charitable Contributions: 
The Case of Nonitemizing Taxpayers, 19 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N, 1997 Supp., 1, 2 (citation omitted). 
 33. Duquette, supra note 25, at 203. 
 34. Id. at 204. 
 35. Dunbar & Phillips, supra note 32, at 1. 
 36. Id. at 2. 
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nonitemizers was worth keeping.37 In 1984, the Treasury released a 
report concluding that the charitable deduction for nonitemizers 
should not be extended. In the report, the Treasury reasoned that 
there was unnecessary complexity in enforcing ERTA and that it 
stimulated little additional giving.38 It was also unnecessarily 
complex for itemizing taxpayers, who had to calculate their taxes 
twice to determine which deduction would decrease their tax bill 
the most: once with the traditional charitable deduction and once 
taking the standard deduction and the new charitable deduction 
for nonitemizers.39 Another reason for ERTA’s ineffectiveness 
according to the Treasury was that nonitemizers gave small dona-
tions that were not made in response to tax incentives. These 
donations probably would have been made by nonitemizers even 
in the absence of ERTA.40 One proposal in 1986 to keep the non-
itemizer deduction with a $100 floor was rejected without expla-
nation, and Congress let ERTA expire in 1987.41 This is puzzling, as 
it was clear that lifting the limitation on nonitemizer deductions in 
1986 prompted more taxpayers to give and at higher rates than ever 
before. Many scholars believe that Congress was unwise to allow 
the expiration of this effective tax subsidy when it did not preserve 
the charitable deduction for nonitemizers in ERTA.42 At the very 
least, ERTA demonstrates that all taxpayers, not just the wealthy 
who currently enjoy the benefits of the deduction for charitable 
contributions, respond in some degree to tax incentives to give 
to charity. 
IV. HOW TCJA CHANGED TAX INCENTIVES TO DONATE 
It is clear from the previous Part that donating to charity in the 
United States is, in part, driven by tax incentives. In December of 
2017, TCJA introduced three changes that will expire after 2025 and 
will most likely reduce the total amount of charitable donations in 
the United States until then. First, the standard deduction was 
 
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. Id. at 4–5. 
 39. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 7. 
 40. Dunbar & Phillips, supra note 32, at 5. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. at 18. 
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doubled. Second, the estate tax exemption was increased to 
$11.2 million. Third, the state and local tax deduction was capped 
at $10,000.43 Each of these changes decreases the incentive to donate 
to charity by reducing the number of people who can take the 
charitable deduction, removing tax incentives to donate to charity 
for some estates, and leaving taxpayers in high-tax states with less 
money to donate to charity. 
A. Doubling the Standard Deduction 
The new provisions in TCJA will prevent many middle-class 
families from taking a charitable deduction because these pro-
visions doubled the amount of the standard deduction. A taxpayer 
can choose between itemizing and taking the standard deduction. 
If a taxpayer’s itemized deductions add up to more than the stan-
dard deduction, they will take the itemized deduction because it 
will subtract more from their taxable income, leaving them with 
less income that can be taxed. The standard deduction in 2017 for a 
single taxpayer was $6350, and $12,700 for married taxpayers filing 
jointly.44 For the 2018 tax year, TCJA will almost double the stan-
dard deduction. A single taxpayer in 2018 can expect a standard 
deduction of $12,000, and married taxpayers filing jointly can take 
a standard deduction of $24,000.45 Now, in order to itemize, a 
married couple filing jointly must have total itemized deductions 
of more than $24,000. This means that many taxpayers who 
previously itemized will have an easier time doing their taxes 
because they will not have to keep track of home mortgage interest, 
state and local taxes, medical expenses, and charitable contribu-
tions. However, this will cause some middle-income couples who 
previously itemized to no longer itemize, because their total 
itemized deductions will no longer exceed the standard deduction. 
This means they will no longer be able to deduct charitable 
 
 43. H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted). 
 44. Kelly Phillips Erb, IRS Announces 2017 Tax Rates, Standard Deductions, Exemption 
Amounts and More, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2016, 4:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillips 
erb/2016/10/25/irs-announces-2017-tax-rates-standard-deductions-exemption-amounts 
-and-more/#22c1de8c5701. 
 45. TAX FOUND., PRELIMINARY DETAILS AND ANALYSIS OF THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 
(Dec. 2017), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20171220113959/TaxFoundation-SR241-TCJA 
-3.pdf. 
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donations from their taxable income.46 It also bears mentioning 
that the standard deduction reduces a taxpayer’s taxable income 
for federal tax purposes, not for state taxes. State taxes will not 
be reduced as a result of the increase in the standard deduction. 
Doubling the standard deduction is, therefore, bad news for 
charities. TCJA will reduce the number of taxpayers who will be 
able to take the charitable deduction.47 Those who will continue to 
itemize are wealthy individuals and families who have itemized 
deductions greater than $24,000. Taxpayers with an adjusted gross 
income of at least $100,000, possibly as high as $200,000, may have 
over $24,000 in itemized deductions, per Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) data.48 This is incongruent with the original purpose of the 
charitable deduction and only provides a tax incentive for the 
wealthy to donate to charity. Roger Colinvaux, law professor and 
former legislation counsel on Congress’s nonpartisan Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation, had the following to say concerning this issue: 
 One of the points of the charitable deduction is to foster 
altruism, to foster pluralism, to foster civic society . . . . If the 
deduction ends up being for the top 5 percent of taxpayers who 
are the wealthiest, I think you’re really painting a very elitist 
picture of what this incentive is for. It’s only incentivizing the 
charitable choices of the richest, and the pluralism of the richest, 
and the civic groups chosen by the wealthiest.49 
U.S. tax law should not provide incentives that solely 
incentivize the wealthy to donate to charities. As the current law 
stands, it does present an elitist picture of the charitable deduction’s 
purpose, as Professor Colinvaux remarked. 
 
 46. McQueeney, supra note 2. 
 47. Zampelli & Yen, supra note 15, at 113. 
 48. I extracted this example from the IRS’s tax statistics on individuals for the taxable 
year of 2016. See generally SOI Tax Stats–Individual Statistical Tables by Size of Adjusted Gross 
Income, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size 
-of-adjusted-gross-income (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). Specifically, I looked to Tables 1.4 and 
2.1 for the 2016 taxable year. Id. 
 49. Johnson, supra note 1. 
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B. Increasing the Estate Tax Exemption 
The estate tax encourages charitable giving when one passes 
away by allowing a deduction for charitable bequests that are 
greater than an exemption floor provided by the tax law and less 
than the gross amount of the entire estate.50 Indeed, due to tax 
incentives, some estates give more than half of their wealth to 
nonprofits in order to pay less estate tax.51 Annually, estates give 
an estimated $20 billion in charitable bequests.52 This is a significant 
source of funding for charities and nonprofits. 
TCJA increases the estate tax exemption, which will almost 
certainly reduce the number and amount of charitable bequests.53 
By doubling the estate tax exemption from $5.6 million to 
$11.2 million, or $22.4 million for couples, TCJA will reduce the 
number of estates facing an estate tax and for which an estate tax 
charitable contribution can be beneficial.54 The number of taxable 
estates will decrease by approximately two-thirds in 2018, leaving 
only about 1700 estates that will owe federal tax and thus retain the 
incentive to give to charity.55 TCJA also reduces the amount of 
estate tax these 1700 estates would owe, which will shrink from 
$20.4 billion to an estimated $13.6 billion.56 The heirs of a few 
wealthy decedents will now receive an estimated $7 billion as a 
result of TCJA.57 Not only does this reduce the number of people 
who can benefit by donating to charity at death, it produces the 
same problem discussed in the previous section; that is, it only 
incentivizes the extremely wealthy with estates worth more than 
 
 50. See Harvey P. Dale & Roger Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions Deduction: 
Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX L. 331, 358 n.187 (2015). 
 51. David Joulfaian, On Estate Tax Repeal and Charitable Bequests, TAX NOTES 1221, 1223 
(June 8, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415058. 
 52. Id. at 1221. 
 53. JON M. BAKIJA & WILLIAM G. GALE, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., EFFECTS OF 
ESTATE TAX REFORM ON CHARITABLE GIVING (July 2003), https://www.urban.org/research 
/publication/effects-estate-tax-reform-charitable-giving (Tax Policy Issues and Options Ser. 
No. 6). 
 54. See TAX FOUND., supra note 45. 
 55. Howard Gleckman, Only 1,700 Estates Would Owe Estate Tax in 2018 Under the 
TCJA, TAX POL’Y CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www. 
taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/only-1700-estates-would-owe-estate-tax-2018-under-tcja. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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$11.2 million to donate to charity. This exemption was $600,000 just 
twenty years ago, providing the incentive to donate to charity for 
many more people than TCJA does.58 Charitable donations from 
estates, as a result of the estate tax, are an important income source 
for charities. If the estate tax were repealed, charitable bequests 
would drop anywhere between an estimated $3.6 billion and 
$6 billion.59 As a result of the new law, fewer people will leave 
money to nonprofits, potentially leaving some charities without an 
important source of funding.60 
C. Capping the State and Local Tax Deduction 
and Lowering Income Tax Rates 
TCJA will also cap the state and local tax (SALT) deduction at a 
maximum of $10,000.61 “The SALT deduction [in some form] has 
been part of every version of the [tax code in U.S. history].”62 The 
SALT deduction is an oft-debated provision in the tax code, but 
many agree that despite its weaknesses, it is an efficient subsidy 
that is worth keeping.63 It encourages states to spend more on 
public services and move toward a progressive income tax, 
reducing overall income inequality.64 It reduces the cost for 
localities and states to raise taxes on the wealthy.65 The new TCJA 
cap on the SALT deduction makes it more expensive for states 
and localities to tax the wealthy.66 It will also reduce the like-
lihood that taxpayers will have itemized deductions in excess of 
the standard deduction. 
The deduction cap of $10,000 may seem high, but the average 
SALT deduction in recent years was actually greater than $10,000 
in twenty states.67 It isn’t unique for a taxpayer to take a SALT 
 
 58. McQueeney, supra note 2. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Johnson, supra note 1. 
 61. TAX FOUND., supra note 45. 
 62. Tracy Gordon, The Price We Pay for Capping the SALT Deduction, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org 
/taxvox/price-we-pay-capping-salt-deduction. 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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deduction of more than $10,000, so it is reasonable that this cap will 
prompt some taxpayers to not itemize and thus not allow them to 
take advantage of the charitable deduction. Taxpayers in high-tax 
states such as Oregon, California, Pennsylvania, and New York, 
who rely heavily on the state and local tax deduction to reduce their 
taxable income, will be hit hardest by the new cap. Losing this 
deduction, especially when coupled with the doubling of the 
standard deduction, will leave itemizers in these states with less 
money to give to charity.68 
TCJA also lowered individual income tax rates, which reduces 
the value of tax deductions, including the deduction for charitable 
contributions.69 The income tax subsidy for charitable giving was 
reduced by approximately one-third, or from $63 billion to an 
estimated $42 billion, so the higher cost of charitable giving will 
make it too expensive to give for many taxpayers whose giving was 
primarily motivated by tax incentives.70 Now, the average marginal 
tax benefit for giving to charity will drop from almost 21% to an 
estimated 15%.71 This number will drop more significantly for low- 
and middle-income taxpayers; but for those in the top 1%, it will 
only fall from about 30% to an estimated 29%.72 These reductions in 
marginal tax benefits will even prompt a reduction in the per-
centage of taxpayers who itemize and earn between $86,000 and 
$150,000. The percentage of taxpayers who itemize and fall in this 
income range will drop from 39% to an estimated 15%.73 As it is 
now, TCJA does much to reduce incentives to give to charity for 
middle- and low-income earners while preserving this incentive for 
the top earners in America. 
In the wake of TCJA, high-tax states have rallied to propose new 
solutions to the cap on the SALT deduction. New York Governor 
Andrew Cuomo said that limiting the deduction on state and local 
 
 68. McQueeney, supra note 2. 
 69. Howard Gleckman, 21 Million Taxpayers Will Stop Taking the Charitable Deduction 
Under the TCJA, TAX POL’Y CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 8, 2018), http:// 
www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/21-million-taxpayers-will-stop-taking-charitable-deduc 
tion-under-tcja. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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taxes was an “act of war.”74 California Senate leader Kevin de Leon 
said that the cap on the SALT deduction is a “tax scam [that] 
disproportionately harms California taxpayers.”75 In response, 
high-tax states are trying to find ways to offset the harm to their 
taxpayers. One proposal that is gaining traction in Connecticut 
would impose a new tax on partnerships, LLCs, and other pass-
through businesses while giving the owners of such businesses a 
tax credit to offset this amount.76 The SALT deduction cap does not 
apply to businesses, and giving a credit to business owners 
effectively shifts an estimated $600 million in lost SALT deductions 
back to Connecticut residents.77 If the federal government adopted 
this proposal, it would pay for the removal of adverse effects of 
TCJA on Connecticut taxpayers. Another proposal in New York 
would replace the individual state income tax with a business 
payroll tax that would be fully deductible.78  
In California, another high-tax state, one popular proposal is to 
change state and local taxes into charitable gifts to nonprofits that 
would be organized by the state and fund services such as 
education.79 Both of these proposals have gained some support, but 
some tax experts do not consider them feasible due to the technical 
problems that would be created upon implementation.80 The 
Connecticut plan also has limitations because it would protect 
owners of pass-through entities without helping workers who 
receive income in the form of wages and salaries.81 The proposal 
would also encourage owners of  S corporations, partnerships, and 
other pass-through entities to move their businesses to Connecticut 
to take advantage of this potential tax break.82 This proposal 
 
 74. Gordon, supra note 62. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Howard Gleckman, Could States Fix the SALT Deduction Cap by Taxing Pass-
Throughs and Giving Their Owners a Credit?, TAX POL’Y CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/could-states-fix-salt 
-deduction-cap-taxing-pass-throughs-and-giving-their-owners-credit. 
 77. Amy Hamilton, Connecticut Finds a SALT Workaround that Would Actually Work, 
TAX NOTES (Feb. 26, 2018). 
 78. Gleckman, supra note 69. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 
002.ALSTON_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:26 PM 
859 The Nonprofit Sector’s Uncertain Future 
 875 
perpetuates one of the main problems with TCJA and the Internal 
Revenue Code in general—disproportionate tax breaks for the 
wealthy.83 Increases in the standard deduction and estate tax 
exemption, along with the new cap for SALT deductions and 
income tax rates imposed by TCJA, generally give taxpayers the 
incentive to take the standard deduction and discourage them from 
giving to charity for tax purposes. 
V. POTENTIAL FIXES TO PROBLEMS INTRODUCED BY TCJA 
The new tax legislation from 2018 seems to significantly dimin-
ish tax incentives to donate to charity. I will now propose changes 
to TCJA that would preserve these important incentives. First, I will 
propose a charitable deduction for nonitemizers, examine the 
history of the charitable deduction, and explore its benefits. I will 
then address possible problems such as the administrative costs 
and enforcement problems associated with implementing a 
charitable deduction for all taxpayers. In response to these valid 
concerns, I propose that a charitable deduction with a floor could 
be an efficient subsidy despite the aforementioned problems. I will 
also briefly discuss other changes to TCJA that would result in 
more charitable giving, including extending the deadline for 
charitable deductions to April 15 and eliminating the phaseout for 
charitable deductions. If properly designed, changes to TCJA could 
provide efficient tax subsidies to more taxpayers who would then 
give more to charity. 
A. Charitable Deduction for Nonitemizers 
One popular proposal to make the charitable deduction avail-
able to more taxpayers is to open up the charitable deduction to 
both itemizers and nonitemizers and introduce a universal chari-
table deduction. In the U.S. tax system before TCJA, there was a 
charitable deduction available to itemizers, a group that represents 
only 25% of U.S. taxpayers.84 Proposals for a universal charitable 
deduction are motivated by desires to increase the amount of 
charitable donations, to protect the interests of charities, and to 
 
 83. See Johnson, supra note 1. 
 84. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 1. 
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protect the incentive to donate to charity from being reduced by 
other reforms.85 However, extending the charitable deduction to 
nonitemizers may decrease federal revenue by as much as 3.8%.86 
As a stand-alone policy, this would not be very efficient. Although 
it would increase charitable donations in light of the 1981 Economic 
Recovery Tax Act,87 a charitable deduction for nonitemizers would 
most likely increase the government’s revenue losses at a greater 
rate.88 The cost of the IRS enforcing a regime where all charitable 
donations were deductible, along with the costs of letting taxpayers 
take the standard deduction and a charitable deduction, would 
offset the increases in giving that would supposedly result from a 
universal charitable deduction. If a charitable deduction were intro-
duced with other key features, it could actually increase giving and 
be a more efficient subsidy. This section explains the history of the 
charitable deduction to demonstrate its purpose, outlines how a 
universal charitable deduction would work, and presents potential 
problems and ways to overcome them, including other key features 
that would create an economically efficient subsidy. Understand-
ing the history of the charitable deduction is the first step in ana-
lyzing the impact of a universal charitable deduction. 
1. Brief overview of the charitable deduction 
After the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress 
enacted an income tax in the Revenue Act of 1913.89 Policymakers 
did not enact a charitable deduction until four years later when the 
War Revenue Act of 1917 was passed in response to concerns that 
charitable giving would drop due to a new, higher tax rate.90 The 
charitable deduction provided what is economically the same as a 
matching government grant equal to the contribution amount 
multiplied by the donor’s marginal income tax rate.91 For example, 
for a taxpayer with a marginal tax rate of 30%, the government 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Johnson, supra note 1. 
 87. See discussion supra Part III. 
 88. See generally ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18. 
 89. Id. at 2. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 404. 
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essentially pays for 30% of each dollar that the taxpayer donates to 
charity, decreasing the after-tax cost of the donation to the taxpayer 
by the same amount.92 One motive behind the charitable deduction 
was to provide an incentive for taxpayers to donate to charitable 
organizations. This incentive was a necessary one because the 
charitable sector could sometimes more efficiently solve problems 
than the government or an individual acting alone.93 
Another motive behind the introduction of the charitable deduc-
tion was to more appropriately define the tax base. By measuring 
“taxable income as income less charitable giving,” the government 
could more accurately measure the income tax base for purposes of 
taxation.94 This justification is an illustration of the ability-to-pay 
principle and a recognition that income spent on consumption 
should be taxed differently than income spent on charitable dona-
tions, because these expenditures are so different in result.95 For 
example, under this theory a taxpayer who had a gross income of 
$50,000 but gave $10,000 to charity should pay the same amount of 
tax as a taxpayer who is in all other ways similar but had a gross 
income of $40,000 and did not donate anything to charity. They 
both have the ability to split $40,000 between consumption and 
saving, because the money donated to charity cannot increase their 
personal wealth either now or in the future. The ability-to-pay 
theory is also not a universally accepted theory. For example, the 
Joint Committee on Taxation classifies the charitable contribution 
as a tax expenditure in its annual list of tax expenditures.96 The 
charitable contribution deduction would not be a tax expenditure if 
it were considered a necessary element in measuring ability to pay.  
Some other important nuances to the charitable deduction were 
introduced later. Now, there are multiple rules about how much of 
a charitable deduction can be taken, depending on the type of gift 
and the type of organization that receives it.97 Contributions to 
charity under TCJA cannot exceed 60% of a taxpayer’s adjusted 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 2. 
 95. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 405. 
 96. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-17, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDI-
TURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2016–2020, at 37 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 97. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 403. 
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gross income,98 but depending on the character of the donation this 
limit can be as low as 20%.99 Charitable deductions are also limited 
to donations given during the previous calendar year, but not 
limited until taxes are due on April 15 of the current year.100 When 
considering the complexity now associated with determining one’s 
eligibility for the charitable deduction, it is understandable that one 
of the motivations behind TCJA was to create a more simplified 
system to make taxes easier for unsophisticated parties. Unfor-
tunately, TCJA did this at the expense of charities. The charitable 
deduction has been included as a vital part of the U.S. tax law for 
more than a century, and a universal charitable deduction could 
help charities by making the charitable deduction accessible to 
more taxpayers. 
2. Benefits of a universal charitable deduction 
A universal charitable deduction is more important now than 
ever because charities face the prospect of fewer itemizers in 2018 
than in any previous year. In 2017, itemizers gave approximately 
$239 billion to charities, while nonitemizers gave around 
$53 billion.101 In other words, itemizers gave 82% of all the money 
contributed to charities in 2017. This is due in part to the fact that 
itemizers are usually wealthier and have more money to donate in 
the first place. However, wealthier nonitemizers who itemized 
before TCJA have more access to tax-planning services and, 
therefore, will likely take advantage of the standard deduction 
more this year than in past years. Members of this group may curb 
their charitable giving, donating less to charity if they do not 
itemize. A universal charitable deduction would prompt higher-
income, nonitemizing families, who would take the standard 
deduction under TCJA, to donate to charity.102 
The following table shows estimates of how much charitable 
giving would increase if a charitable deduction were extended to 
all taxpayers.103 The total contributions column represents the 
 
 98. H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted). 
 99. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 408. 
 100. Id. at 403. 
 101. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18. 
 102. Id. at 5–6. 
 103. Id. at 6. 
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amount, in billions, that each income quintile contributed to charity 
in 2017. The next three columns measure the amount that an income 
quintile would increase charitable donations in response to a chari-
table deduction being available to everyone. The first column, with 
an elasticity of 0.5, measures a modest response to the universal 
charitable deduction. If the response to the deduction were modest 
with an elasticity of 0.5, charitable donations would increase by 
$5 billion. Most of the extra charitable giving comes from the 
middle-, fourth-, and top-income quintiles, while lower-income 
families do not donate much more because they have less discre-
tionary income. If the reaction to the universal charitable deduction 
were more responsive, as measured in the chart by the column 
where elasticity is 1.0, then there would be an estimated increase in 
giving as high as $10 billion. Note that in this example, tax units 
with negative adjusted gross income are excluded from the quintile 
estimates but are included in the totals in the bottom row, resulting 
in lower total increases in giving.104 
Table 2 
 
Another benefit of a universal charitable deduction is that it 
makes marketing by charities more effective because the charitable 
deduction is available to everyone the advertisement reaches.105 A 
universal charitable deduction means that donated money from 
both itemizers and nonitemizers is subsidized by the government, 
so the after-tax cost of giving is the same for both groups.  
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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An additional benefit of a universal charitable deduction is 
evident in light of 1981’s tax legislation that created a second chari-
table deduction in addition to the charitable deduction available to 
itemizers.106 For taxpayers to decide which charitable deduction to 
take, they had to calculate what their taxes would be if they 
itemized and then calculate their potential tax liability if they took 
the standard deduction and the charitable deduction for nonitem-
izers. This comparison would show which of the two deductions 
would be more beneficial. This created additional complexity and 
was one reason why this second charitable deduction was abol-
ished by 1987. A single charitable deduction for itemizers and non-
itemizers would preserve the incentive to donate to charity for all 
taxpayers without increasing the complexity of filing one’s taxes. 
3. IRS enforcement and administrative cost problems 
The last time that a universal charitable deduction was avail-
able to taxpayers, a few problems with the proposal became 
apparent. The first problem was that the IRS would have had a 
difficult time enforcing a universal charitable deduction. For 
taxpayers, a universal charitable deduction would mean that 
everyone would have to keep track of how much they were 
donating to charity.107 This would make it much more difficult for 
the IRS to enforce the tax code. The IRS only audits less than 1% of 
individual tax returns because it has limited resources.108 More 
charitable deductions could potentially mean more tax fraud. 
Leading up to the 1984 tax reform, the IRS argued against this type 
of deduction, saying that it created unnecessary complexity, did not 
stimulate much additional giving, and would require more 
resources than they had available to enforce.109 It referred to these 
issues as “a difficult enforcement problem.”110 Historically, the IRS 
has not put great effort into investigating whether charitable 
deductions were legally taken. The IRS also has almost no way to 
verify some casual donations, such as money contributed to 
 
 106. Id. at 7. 
 107. Id. at 6. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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collection tins at churches and money donated to people knocking 
on doors for donations.111 
Nonitemizers in the 1980s who took the charitable deduction 
generally reported very small amounts of charitable donations on 
their tax returns.112 Without assuming that these donations were 
fraudulent, it is at least reasonable to assume that many of these 
small amounts would be hard for taxpayers to document if they 
were audited. The IRS would not have the resources to audit 
returns that reported very small deductions. As such, the charitable 
deduction for nonitemizers in the 1980s imposed increased com-
plexity costs on both taxpayers and the IRS, which was ultimately 
one of the key reasons it was discontinued.113 
Another issue facing a universal charitable deduction is what 
has been referred to as the “administrative cost” problem.114 The 
administrative cost problem is that a universal charitable deduction 
could incentivize some itemizers to reduce their taxes without 
increasing their giving.115 In this “double-dipping” scenario, non-
itemizers would be able to take both the standard and charitable 
deductions, reaping the benefits of the standard deduction while 
also receiving the charitable deduction, a provision traditionally 
preserved for taxpayers who itemize.116 The following example 
provides an explanation of this scenario. Suppose that a household 
must choose between a standard deduction of $6000 or an itemized 
deduction of $7000, and that $2000 of those itemized deductions are 
charitable contributions.117 Under the current tax law, this house-
hold would itemize and take deductions worth $7000. However, 
under a universal charitable deduction this household would take 
the standard deduction of $6000 plus a charitable deduction of 
$2000, for total deductions of $8000. This increases deductions for 
the household by $1000 over the current law. Tax savings by the 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. JOSEPH CORDES ET AL., URB. INST., EXTENDING THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION TO 
NONITEMIZERS: POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS 1 (May 2000), http://webarchive.urban.org 
/UploadedPDF/310338_cnp_7.pdf (Charting Civil Society Ser. No. 7). 
 113. Id. at 2. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Gordon, supra note 62 (citations omitted). 
 117. CORDES ET AL., supra note 112, at 2. 
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taxpayer are revenue costs to the government, and this household 
took a higher deduction without increasing the amount of their 
charitable giving. Thus, the universal charitable deduction can add 
costs to the government from taxpayers who did not give more to 
charity, which is a key goal of the universal charitable deduction. A 
universal charitable deduction would cost an estimated $13 billion 
annually for the federal government, attributable to enforcement 
and administrative costs.118 In the model in the previous section,119 
even by very optimistic projections, the universal charitable deduc-
tion would only generate around $10 billion, which on its own 
would make this proposal inefficient. 
4. Adding a floor 
Despite the problems with IRS enforcement and the admini-
strative costs associated with a universal charitable deduction, a 
cleverly designed deduction could address these concerns while 
increasing charitable giving with little cost in tax revenue. 
Policymakers generally agree that when the cost of giving falls, 
people give more.120 However, some studies disagree as to how 
much changes in the after-tax cost of charitable donations affect 
how much people give to charity. A number of studies find that 
giving is modestly responsive to changes in the after-tax cost of 
giving, while other studies are more optimistic.121 One study by the 
Urban Institute found that it is possible to implement a universal 
charitable deduction that addresses concerns with IRS enforcement 
and administrative costs even if the responsiveness of charitable 
giving to differences in the after-tax cost of giving is low.122 Such a 
deduction could reduce pressure on the IRS and decrease the 
administrative costs of a universal charitable deduction by introdu-
cing a minimum amount of charitable contributions above which 
all contributions would be deductible.123 Introducing a floor would 
not be an unprecedented move, as a $100 floor for a universal 
 
 118. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 2. 
 119. See discussion supra Part V.A.2. 
 120. See ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 3. 
 121. Id. 
 122. CORDES ET AL., supra note 112, at 5–6. 
 123. Id. 
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charitable deduction was proposed as a response to ERTA in 
1985.124 Other more recent proposals would have allowed nonitem-
izers to deduct charitable contributions for donations above $1000 
for taxpayers filing singly and $2000 for married taxpayers filing 
jointly.125 The difficult part of this proposal is to set the floor at an 
amount where taxpayers will respond to the incentive. If the floor 
were set at an amount above which people usually wouldn’t give 
without a deduction, this could be a cost-effective strategy. It would 
also limit the number of charitable contributions that the IRS would 
have to monitor.126 The floor could be set at either a percentage of 
income or a dollar amount, depending on what would be most 
efficient. A universal charitable deduction with a floor would also 
simplify taxes for taxpayers who contributed small amounts to 
charity, conforming to one of the overarching purposes of the 
current tax law.127 The results from this study are summarized in 
the following table and discussed below.128 
Table 3 
Summary of Revenue Effects and Change in Charitable Giving (Dollar Amounts in Millions), 1995 Income Levels 
 
The Urban Institute measured the changes in charitable giving 
and tax revenue that result from four different ways to extend a 
 
 124. Dunbar & Phillips, supra note 32, at 5. 
 125. Duquette, supra note 25, at 196. 
 126. C. Eugene Steuerle, Charities Have Plenty of Opportunity to Advance Giving Despite 
Tax Law Losses, TAX POL’Y CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/charities-have-plenty-opportunity-advance-giving 
-despite-tax-law-losses. 
 127. See CORDES ET AL., supra note 112, at 2. 
 128. Id. at 3. 
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charitable deduction to nonitemizers.129 Under the first scenario, 
the charitable deduction would be available to nonitemizers with 
the first dollar given.130 The results from this scenario showed that 
the concerns with IRS enforcement and administrative cost related 
to a charitable deduction for nonitemizers are warranted. Extend-
ing the charitable deduction to nonitemizers seems to decrease tax 
revenue more than it would increase charitable giving, even if the 
amount of charitable giving were moderately responsive to fluc-
tuations in the cost of giving.131 However, if taxpayers were very 
responsive to decreases in the cost of giving, this scenario could be 
efficient, with an estimated increase in total revenue (the change in 
giving less revenue effects) at over $1 billion.132 
The second scenario would let nonitemizers deduct charitable 
contributions, but only at amounts greater than $250 for single filers 
and $500 for joint filers.133 The study found that adding a floor had 
two effects.134 First, the floor reduced the enforcement cost for the 
IRS attributable to taxpayers claiming small deductions that are 
hard to document because the $250 or $500 floor mostly excluded 
these types of donations.135 This reduction in administrative costs 
attributable to the floor still resulted in a total revenue loss, but less 
of a loss than would occur under the first scenario.136 Second, 
adding the floor may have decreased the costs associated with 
extending the charitable deduction to itemizers, but it does little to 
increase charitable giving.137 This represents nonitemizers who 
were already giving to charity without a tax incentive to do so.138 In 
this scenario, the floor does not provide much of a subsidy to giving 
that would happen in the absence of an incentive.139 
The third scenario represents the result of a universal charitable 
deduction with the floor from the second scenario of $500 or $250 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 4. 
 134. Id. at 3. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 4. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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depending on the taxpayer’s filing status.140 The only difference 
between this scenario and the second scenario is that the floor is 
extended to all taxpayers and not just nonitemizers.141 With a 28% 
tax rate as an example, this floor would cost an itemizer filing a joint 
return about $150.142 In this scenario, even if the responsiveness to 
changes in the cost of giving is minimal, the extra giving exceeds 
the revenue cost.143 
The fourth and last scenario in the Urban Institute study set 
floors at a calculated level that would result in no overall loss in tax 
revenue.144 The results from this study clarify that as long as the 
floor is set at the right level, there is a way to create a charitable 
deduction for nonitemizers that increases charitable giving and is 
also revenue neutral.145 The universal deduction with a universal 
floor opens up the opportunity to shift a tax subsidy to the margins 
where giving is actually sensitive to price even with a modest 
response.146 This allows taxpayers to receive a subsidy because they 
are actually giving at levels at which they would not give in the 
absence of a floor. This scenario would eliminate the need for any 
taxpayers to keep track of their small contributions and not require 
the IRS to enforce a tax regime without the necessary resources to 
do so.147 Implementing a floor at the right amount would encourage 
additional giving and reduce administrative costs to the point 
where a universal charitable deduction makes fiscal sense. 
Another possible solution to the previously discussed IRS 
enforcement and administrative costs is to improve information-
reporting systems from charitable organizations. If charities pro-
vided electronic or written forms to the IRS and to people from 
whom they received donations, they could significantly help the 
IRS in its efforts to enforce the tax law.148 This proposal would cost 
the IRS virtually no money and, since many charities must already 
 
 140. Id. at 3. 
 141. Id. at 4. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 3. 
 145. Id. at 4. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 6–7. 
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provide taxpayers with official tax documents reflecting any 
donations over $250,149 it would not cost charities much either. This 
would also help reduce noncompliance with the tax law and help 
the government regain revenue associated with people who mis-
represent how much they actually donate to charity.150 
B. Extend Deducting Power Through April 15 
Allowing taxpayers to deduct charitable donations through 
April 15 instead of December 31 for a given tax year would provide 
an incentive for taxpayers to donate to charity and cut their tax bill 
just before their taxes are due.151 This would be similar to how 
contributions to individual retirement accounts function, providing 
the same incentive and hopefully resulting in more money for 
charitable organizations to work with.152  
There is precedent for extending the charitable deduction 
deadline. Both President Barack Obama and President George W. 
Bush have signed provisions that for a limited time allowed 
charitable donations toward natural disaster relief to be deducted 
as late as March for the previous tax year.153 Making this a 
permanent part of the tax code would help solve the advertising 
problems of a temporary measure that allows donations made past 
the traditional deadline to be deductible.154 Evidence suggests that 
people make decisions about charitable giving at the last minute. 
One survey in particular shows that 22% of online charitable 
donations are made during the last two days of December.155 
Additionally, if tax software companies and tax preparers could 
compute taxpayers’ tax liability and then show them how extra 
donations to charity could reduce their taxable income, it would 
create a powerful incentive for taxpayers to give to charity.156 
Advertising charitable giving before tax time would create the best 
 
 149. Id. at 7. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Steuerle, supra note 126. 
 152. Steuerle & Sullivan, supra note 7, at 429. 
 153. C. Eugene Steuerle, Extending the Charitable Deduction Deadline to Tax Day, URBAN-
BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., (Mar. 2013), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/pub 
lication/23416/412769-Extending-the-Charitable-Deduction-Deadline-to-Tax-Day.PDF 
(Tax Policy and Charities Project Brief No. 3). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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window of opportunity for taxpayers to give and allow taxpayers 
more certainty in how their donations will help them cut their 
tax bill. 
C. Eliminate the Phaseout for Charitable Deductions 
The Pease provision is a section in the Internal Revenue Code 
that limits the amount of itemized deductions by 3 cents per dollar 
above a certain adjusted gross income threshold ($313,800 for 
married couples filing jointly and $261,500 for single returns in 
2017).157 This phaseout is capped at 80% of the value of all itemized 
deductions.158 Although TCJA suspended the Pease provision 
through the end of 2025, it is important to consider the implications 
Pease has on a universal charitable deduction.159 By adding this 
provision to the Code, Congress has found a way to cut revenue 
losses resulting from itemized deductions taken by high-income 
taxpayers. The rationale for this cut is that top earners in America 
don’t need deductions for home mortgage interest, since these 
subsidies were designed to help poorer Americans pay less tax. 
Although the Pease provision has little to no effect on giving 
since few taxpayers are subject to the 80% cap, it poses a problem 
for a universal charitable deduction. A universal charitable deduc-
tion would remove charitable contributions from the itemized 
deductions that are subject to the Pease provision.160 In some 
models, eliminating the Pease provision altogether would not have 
any significant effect on the amount of charitable giving and would 
mostly benefit high-income taxpayers.161 If Pease were applied to 
both itemized deductions and a universal charitable deduction, it 
would create complex problems similar to those associated with the 
1981 charitable deduction for nonitemizers.162 So, although not 
necessary, eliminating the phaseout for itemized deductions could 
actually increase charitable giving because the after-tax cost of 
 
 157. Erb, supra note 44. 
 158. 26 U.S.C. § 68(a)(2) (2018). 
 159. H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted). 
 160. ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 7. 
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donating to a charity remains the same and does not decrease with 
each additional dollar donated.163 
VI. WHAT CHARITIES CAN DO IN RESPONSE TO TCJA 
As charities prepare for the worst in the aftermath of TCJA, they 
have not yet made a unified effort to speak out against the new tax 
law.164 Charities typically are reluctant to get involved in partisan 
debates, perhaps due to fear of losing vital federal grants.165 The 
nonprofit industry is also very diverse and not particularly 
coordinated.166 However, TCJA did create an opportunity for 
charities to come together and help redesign tax subsidies and 
secure the money they need to do their job.167 Nonprofit organi-
zations have been known to present Congress with wish lists, but 
now is an important time for them to present Congress with 
alternative provisions that could encourage giving without adding 
too much to the budget deficit.168 They need to overcome the 
stereotype that charities are just special interest groups and 
convince lawmakers from both parties of their vital role in 
supporting the public sector. However, charities face a difficult task 
in doing so, as lawmakers are sometimes skeptical of charities 
because of popular stories about people taking advantage of 
charitable donations.169 Others may have become cynical about 
how committed highly compensated nonprofit executives are to 
their cause compared to contributors. 
To illustrate, in the last year a couple of high-profile charities 
made headlines due to fraudulent activities by their owners. One 
prominent charity, Kids Wish Network, raised millions of dollars 
in the name of dying children and their families. However, it spent 
less than 3 cents per dollar helping these children.170 Most of this 
 
 163. James P. Angelini & Nancy Chun Feng, The Effect of Deduction Phaseout on Charitable 
Giving, TAX NOTES 631, 636 (Jan. 29, 2018). 
 164. Johnson, supra note 1. 
 165. E.g., id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Steuerle, supra note 126. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Kris Hundley & Kendall Taggart, America’s 50 Worst Charities Rake in Nearly 
$1 Billion for Corporate Fundraisers, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017, 4:10 PM), http://www. 
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money ended up with the operators of the charity and the 
companies the charity hired to solicit donations.171 Kids Wish 
Network used the fact that its name sounds a lot like a reputable 
charity, the Make-A-Wish Foundation, to solicit millions of dollars 
in donations. In the last ten years, the founder of Kids Wish 
Network received $4.8 million, and in the same period the charity’s 
corporate solicitors received almost $110 million.172 Another recent 
case of charity fraud made headlines when four cancer charities 
took from consumers over $187 million that was not donated to 
cancer patients.173 Donors were told that their money would help 
patients, including women and children suffering from cancer. In 
reality, most of the money ended up with the employees of the 
small charities, along with their families and friends.174 Because 
these sham charities were fundraising for personal gain at the 
expense of women and children battling cancer, the Federal Trade 
Commission, all fifty states, and the District of Columbia filed  
a joint enforcement action condemning deceptive solicitations 
by charities.175 
Abuses of charitable donations by charity operators are not 
limited to these few egregious cases. Charity fraud is a widespread 
problem in the United States. The Tampa Bay Times composed a list 
of the fifty worst charities in the United States in 2017.176 On 
average, the fifty worst charities in the United States give less than 
4% of donations received to their stated cause.177 This research 
compiled by the Tampa Bay Times has brought under scrutiny 6000 
charities that pay for-profit companies to solicit donations for them. 
The list of sins committed by charity operators is staggering and 
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 172. Id. 
 173. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC, All 50 States and D.C. Charge Four 
Cancer Charities with Bilking over $187 Million from Consumers (May 19, 2015), https:// 
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-all-50-states-dc-charge-four-cancer 
-charities-bilking-over. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Hundley & Taggart, supra note 170. 
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donations go, taking multiple salaries, secretly paying themselves 
consulting fees, and using accounting tricks to inflate the value of 
donated items.178 
TCJA reveals that fraudulent activity in the charitable sector is 
a legitimate concern for some lawmakers; the bill provides “a new 
excise tax on nonprofits that pay their executives $1 million or 
more.”179 By being more transparent to the federal government and 
clearly demonstrating what they use their funding for, charities 
could help build the reputation of the charitable sector in the wake 
of well-publicized fraudulent activity. Charities need to clearly 
demonstrate the value the nonprofit sector adds to the country in 
order to overcome these stereotypes. As charities face budget cuts 
and struggle to provide services efficiently, now is an ideal time to 
push the government to commit to the charitable sector. It is also 
an ideal time for the U.S. government to provide tax benefits for 
charities and show that it values groups that help others, rein-
forcing America’s reputation as a country that uses the charitable 
sector to efficiently solve problems.180 
VII. CONCLUSION 
TCJA was an effort to reduce the complexity of the tax law and 
cut taxes for corporations and individuals. One must remember 
that TCJA may be similar to ERTA in that some of the changes may 
only be temporary, but charities and individuals must nevertheless 
cope with these changes and attempt to influence future change. 
How the new law will affect taxpayers will be different for each 
case, as each taxpayer has his or her own unique financial situation. 
However, charities will likely face financial loss due to the 
uncertainty produced by TCJA. Tax incentives for donating to 
charity have been substantially reduced by the new bill, and the 
charitable deduction will be available to fewer taxpayers than ever. 
The history of tax reform in the United States shows that charitable 
giving is motivated in part by tax incentives. The new bill decreases 
potential revenue for charities by doubling the standard deduction, 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Steuerle, supra note 126. 
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increasing the estate tax exemption, and capping the state and local 
tax deduction at $10,000.  
A universal charitable donation floor would preserve the tax 
incentive to donate to charity and also not put any extra strain on 
the IRS. Extending deducting power through April 15 and elimi-
nating the phaseout for charitable deductions are two other ways 
that the government could recommit to a strong and efficient 
charitable sector. If charities can come together and push for these 
changes, they could secure their own future and continue to play 
their important role in supporting the marginalized in the United 
States. This is a worthy goal, and one can only hope that the federal 
government will quickly make necessary changes to bolster the 
charitable sector and remove some of the potentially adverse effects 
of TCJA.  
 
 
JT Alston* 	  
 
*   J.D., December 2018, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I 
would like to thank Professor Cliff Fleming and Professor Gladriel Shobe for their guidance 
and feedback on this Note. 
 
ALSTON_PAA002.ALSTON_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:26 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
892 
 
